Atlantis: Testimonies from Behind the Curtain

“From the depths of the dream, Testimonies of women victims of political violence, Fatna El Bouih, Youssef Maddad.

Mr. Yahman was the first to delve into the memory of one of these women, bridging the gap between us and this region and its victims. We found in Mr. Ahmed Baida, a native of the region and its journalistic memory, a valuable resource. He opened his home to us, generously giving us his time and facilitating our meetings with these women, as he possessed the legal documentation concerning their rights.

We also want to acknowledge that without Ms. Fatima Marnissi’s moral and technical support, which enabled us to write in an environment where we discovered a remarkable woman, a competent researcher, a kind and understanding human being, the authors would not have found their way into existence.

Preface

Moroccan history, especially its contemporary period, encompasses a multitude of scattered details and intricacies awaiting the collaborative efforts of researchers from various backgrounds and scientific fields to weave them together. Far from the illusion of revealing the essence of reality, the challenge lies in invoking certain historical moments that formed essential tributaries in the arduous quest to shape an enlightened consciousness that embraces dialogue and manages differences within a modern, rational framework. This framework establishes the foundations of legitimacy based on human rights principles, guiding us toward the future with confidence and optimism.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Morocco experienced difficult periods characterized mainly by the prevalence of violence and direct aggression against all noble human values. It reached levels of absolute authoritarianism in power and the persecution of any opposition through various forms of intimidation and exclusion, even resorting to physical elimination for those who refused to submit to the inevitable reality.

By exposing the dynamics of domination, oppression, and violence witnessed during a specific era of Morocco’s recent history, within the context of the problem of violence and counter-violence, we can help reveal the key characteristics of the political and social regression that marked this part of the past. These characteristics formed one of the major obstacles to the liberation and development of our country.

Likewise, diagnosing the general characteristics of this approach, which is based on the total exclusion of any opposing voice, can unveil not only its dark side but also valuable lessons that need to be extracted through questioning the victims of this past about their present. It aims to shed light on the secret of their liberation and to what extent they have managed, after all this separation and disconnection, to achieve reconciliation with themselves and their society through positive integration into real life, as they all embody hope for the future.

The contribution of this book in this field is also driven by the desire to unveil the counterfeit veil that shrouds the presence of Moroccan women within this past through the stories of a group of women. Their unity stems from their affiliation with the Ait Khoya tribe in the vicinity of Khénifra city. They were united by a difficult fate, which involved abduction, horrific torture, and imprisonment, simply because they happened to be wives, daughters, and relatives of men who took up arms as a radical choice to change the situation.

Women of the New Hope

Among the figures of this generation who experienced the bitterness of the dark period engulfed by the whirlpool of violence in the 1960s and 1970s of our history are women who suffered forced disappearance, one of the ugliest forms of citizenship deprivation. Their freedoms were taken away, and the oppressor trampled upon their dignity in the most hideous ways. It was all because they happened to be wives, daughters, and relatives of men who believed in the principle of counter-violence against the authority’s oppression and embraced the idea of armed struggle to confront it. They found themselves, without their knowledge, vulnerable to oppression and humiliation.”

Women have lived through the horrors of kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment in all its hideous forms. They have tasted the bitterness of power harassment, societal exclusion, and false accusations of betrayal, enduring what seemed like an eternity. Will their memories fade away forever? Will the scars on their bodies disappear? Does everything that happened in the darkness vanish? Is time truly the healer of hearts? How can we bring light to the darkness? How can this past, which invades the body and writes something unforgettable, become a page in the readable historical records?

If we believe that the future is born from the present through the way we engage in the process of change, rather than emerging from the past, then it becomes the master of days during crises. And if we believe that this experience has only been written on the body after being deprived of the right to freedom of expression, enduring the ordeal of democracy, then it is time to reconcile action with interconnected discourse within the context of that experience. We move forward to mature it, so that it produces new literature.

Many will not forget the evening when Fadma Amaziane intervened, telling her story in her Amazigh language with her powerful warm voice, recounting her suffering and the oppression she endured at the hands of arrogant executioners. Her tongue speaks, saying, “At some point, we lacked anything that could provide evidence of our existence. No identity card, no birth certificate, no family, no homeland. We were erased from the map. Stripped of everything and confined to the narrow space, then the light’s openings came to help us remember and grasp what could be recalled. We are the memory of a phase, having witnessed it, and memory is the beginning of questioning, the path to understanding, the daughter of sensibility. Let us gather those fragments.”

Therefore, examining the history of Morocco is also an examination of the history of women who contributed to laying the foundation for democratic work and freedom of thought. They were women who directly participated in political work, both publicly and secretly, and they were victims of political repression due to their solidarity with a brother, a husband, or a father who was an activist. Our focus on women does not mean exclusivity or discrimination of any kind, but it highlights a reality that has been absent from our minds due to the predominance of silence, and because women’s courage in such situations is often marginalized. It is a new challenge faced by women: political imprisonment, a manifestation of their direct entry into the forefront of history.

We have started to hear fragments of that story, as Corinne Kumar, that remarkable woman, says in her discussion about women breaking the circle of silence. We have begun to hear fragments of the story reverberating through the cracked lips, emerging from the depths of silence.

The experience of Fadma Amaziane and the group of women whose testimonies we will learn about serves as a stark proof of the unjust violations committed against women. They were subjected to torture and beatings in front of their own children, in an attempt to break them during interrogation.

If writing is a means of reconciling with the past, then oral testimony becomes a tattoo we allow to be written, not driven by the desire for documentation or copying, but by the desire to highlight the aesthetic beauty of the tattoo drawn on the wrinkled body swollen with the wounds of the past.

And if we believe that the suffering of these women is more than just a passing event, it is because their experience is linked to circumstances that led them to this fate. So, in order for them not to become mere victims mourned for their fate, some of them have proven their ability to positively engage in creating hope that such events will never be repeated.

This precious wish will only be fulfilled to the extent that we can work on understanding the true backgrounds of what happened and comprehend its fundamental causes in order to extract all the lessons dictated by reading this experience.

Here, we recall what Professor Al-Haras said about the Jebala community, that understanding the events and social phenomena that define the present requires not only observing the current situation and its development, but also looking back. Considering that history is the movement itself through which the nature of any society manifests and expresses itself, attempting to comprehend the historical context that governed the experience of these women requires going back to the events that led to their arrest and highlighting the features of the historical and political framework in which they occurred.

About the events of March 1973

During the month of March 1973, Morocco witnessed violent confrontations between the central authority, which mobilized its regular forces across various regions of the country, and armed groups that aimed to create “revolutionary hotbeds” as a spark for a popular uprising. These events created a state of general alertness, with the security forces, including the gendarmerie, army, and police, mobilizing to confront the armed groups. The goal of these groups was to create an atmosphere of tension and panic in several areas of Morocco, according to official statements.

The official media accompanied this campaign with a series of statements and comments that aimed to discredit the “traitors” and encouraged citizens to condemn the events by rallying around the king.

The events started in the early morning of the third of March when an armed commando attempted to seize ammunition at the Auxiliary Forces Center in Moulai Bouazza, near Khénifra. The attack accidentally resulted in the killing of a guard, leading the commando members to flee and take refuge in the mountains. At the same time, explosions occurred at two gas stations in Khénifra, and clashes took place between the armed commando and forces belonging to the Royal Army in the Koulmimah region in southern Morocco.

Initially, the newspaper Le Monde reported on the events that took place in Casablanca on March 7, 1973. One incident occurred on Saturday, March 3, when an explosive device was discovered under a car belonging to the United States Consulate General in Casablanca, parked in front of the consulate building. The second incident involved the discovery of another explosive device on March 6 in the bathrooms of the American Cultural Center. The newspaper explained that the two devices were discovered in time and safely recovered and detonated in an empty location. It was later revealed that these operations were carried out by a group called Dahkon.

At that time, the official stance was to maintain silence regarding the events that had occurred in general, including the ones in Moulai Bouazza. It was necessary to wait until Wednesday, March 7, for the newspaper L’Opinion to publish an editorial refuting the news circulated by foreign agencies regarding the issue. The editorial stated: “On the last day of Monday (the events occurred on Saturday), some foreign radio stations echoed, without any scrutiny, some affirmations or assumptions coming from certain agencies that, out of ignorance or ill-intention, propagated a distorted image of the situation in Morocco, which can only be matched by the foolishness of the reported events.” The same newspaper published on March 9 the first official reaction to the events of March 3, through a statement from the Ministry of Interior that was broadcasted by the Ministry of Information. According to L’Opinion, the statement mentioned: “A few days ago, a group of saboteurs, estimated by the initial investigation to consist of three individuals, infiltrated from the region of Meknes to the Moulai Bouazza center, which was guarded by two storekeepers. One of them opened the main door to identify who was around the center and was shot dead, while his friend managed to inform the relevant authorities. At the same time, a report was made about an armed group of three individuals in the Koulmimah area.”

Various regions of Morocco, especially the Atlas Mountains, Koulmimah, the northeastern region, and others, experienced extensive combing operations by soldiers, gendarmes, and all types of police forces. The reserve forces were also mobilized to involve citizens in the search for the fleeing militants in the mountains. Checkpoints were set up at major intersections and secondary roads across Morocco to arrest any suspects. Confrontations between

In the context of containing the events, considering that the majority of the rebellious elements originate from the Liberation Army that resisted French colonization, the media highlighted prominently the dinner event organized by the Moroccan monarch on March 26 in honor of the veterans and the Liberation Army. During the event, the monarch delivered a speech condemning the “traitors who extended their hand to foreigners” in an attempt to undermine the royal institution. Following this dinner, which was also attended by Allal Fassi and Ahmed Majid Benjelloun (Minister of Public Works), a general meeting was held for the members of the veterans and Liberation Army, chaired by Prime Minister Ahmed Osman, with the presence of several ministers including Bahennini, the Minister of State, Mohamed Benhima, the Minister of Interior, and others. The latter personally presided over the installation of Colonel Hamou Arzaz (who assumed the position of commander of the Royal Gendarmerie after the assassination of Boualam in the July coup) as the head of the Khénifra district.

During this period, Morocco witnessed the start of a fierce campaign against the National Union of Popular Forces party, considering it responsible for the events. A statement was issued prohibiting what was then called the “Rabat wing,” and a campaign of arrests targeted its leadership as well as its ranks. In a lengthy statement broadcasted by the Ministry of Information, the government revealed the detailed findings of the investigation regarding the events of March 3, which exposed the existence of a real conspiracy involving “officials, militants, and members of a political organization enjoying legitimacy.” The government also accused what was known as the “Rabat group” of “covering up secret conspiratorial and illegitimate practices.” Consequently, on April 2, the government decided to ban the Rabat wing of the National Union of Popular Forces party.

Commenting on the painful events experienced by Morocco, “Hawliyat al-Maghrib” wrote the following: “The consequences of the March 3 events did not succeed in calming tensions or providing concessions capable of pulling the country out of the impasse and returning the political actors to the rules of the democratic game. On the contrary, they were a clear signal of the authority’s tightening grip, as the entire party found itself outside the political arena due to the real or presumed involvement of some of its elements or those affiliated with it. Furthermore, it was a result of the exaggeration that turned secondary events into a ‘maneuver’ that ‘justice’ will pursue.”

Indeed, the judicial file will be set in motion starting from June 25 of the same year, as the Kenitra trial will commence, leading to a series of judgments on August 30 that reflected the seriousness of the situation, tightening the authority’s grip, and its definite desire to suppress any opposition relying on violence. Sixteen death sentences were issued out of the twenty-five requested by the prosecution against the Atlas militants and two members of the secret organization responsible for the revolutionary cells in Morocco, including Omar Dakhon, who had previously been sentenced in absentia twenty years ago in the Marrakesh trial of 1971. Fifteen life sentences were also issued out of the thirty requested by the prosecution, along with fifty-six sentences of varying lengths against other defendants accused of bomb attacks and participation. Additionally, seventy-two defendants were acquitted.”

Two days after the verdict was issued, a group of those who were acquitted was kidnapped, and two weeks later, it was revealed that they were “re-arrested as part of the preliminary investigation into other violations.” On the night of the Eid al-Adha, November 1, three weeks after the cassation decision was rejected, fifteen out of the sixteen convicts were executed, despite the king’s.

To understand the historical and theoretical backgrounds of the events of March 1973,

If we examine the theoretical and intellectual backgrounds behind the conviction of this inclination towards armed action as a means of bringing about political change, we find that this trend extended over two successive generations:

The first generation belongs to the era of resistance and liberation army during the struggle against colonization, such as Mohamed Al-Basri, Ibrahim Al-Tizniti, known as Abdullah Al-Namari, Mohamed Hoshimena, who belonged to the Sargan Cell, Mohamed Al-Abdi during the period of resistance to colonization, and Mohamed Oumada, among others. After independence, they formed the backbone of the radical wing of the National Union of Popular Forces, which emerged from within the ranks of the Independence Party at the beginning of 1959.

The second generation of youth grew up within the National Union of Popular Forces and was raised in an environment characterized primarily by the party’s bitter struggle against the brutal violence imposed upon it by the ruling authority during the 1960s. Among these young people were Omar Dahakoun, Mohamed Benouna, and many others.

The first generation experienced the ordeal of colonization and anticipated living a dignified life in an independent Morocco that would guarantee their dignity. However, they found themselves torn between the option of forced exile abroad and the determination to stay in their country despite the unknown fate that threatened them. Nevertheless, the dream persisted of realizing an alternative Morocco free from falsehood, oppression, and exploitation.

As for the second generation, they embraced the common denominators among these groups in their pride of belonging to the National Union of Popular Forces and were imbued with the party’s deeply rooted nationalist culture during the periods of fierce struggle the party faced in resisting the violent oppression imposed by the ruling authority in the 1960s. Among these young people were Omar Dahakoun, Mohamed Benouna, and many others.

Those who held the conviction of armed action continued to take pride in their affiliation with this party and maintained their convictions as members of the party, despite its conflicting positions and divergent tendencies between the approach of political work within the framework of legitimacy and the choice of armed struggle embraced by a group of activists within the party clandestinely.

Even when Abderrahim, according to Abdelatif Jabrou, stated after the 1963 trial, in response to the charge of conspiracy against the regime, “All that there is, is that some fighters cannot bear what they are subjected to in terms of provocations and despair of the democratic methods used to address the accumulated problems…” (Abdellatif Jabrou, July 16, 1963, pp. 87-88), it does not negate the quality of being fighters among the adherents of this approach. In fact, it can be said, with one of those interested in the history of the party, that “it concerns two paths within the National Union that will constitute a constant factor in the course of the National Union from 1963 to 1973. It relates to clear political work within existing institutions, represented by Abderrahim Bouabid, and the path of changing the regime through armed revolution by means of the armed organizations trained in Syria and Algeria. This choice is led by Mohamed Al-Basri.”

If we go back in history, we find that this problem has its roots in the history of the national movement during the final periods of the struggle against French colonization, during which violence found its legitimacy in armed resistance against forces that monopolized the country’s wealth and crushed the dignity of the Moroccan citizen, stripping him of his identity and civil and political rights.

Armed violence and national struggle against colonization.

The armed resistance occupied a central position within the national struggle for the liberation of its land, which gave it a special status in the attention of historians during this period, whether they were foreigners or Moroccans. It can be said that one of the questions that puzzled many historians of this era revolved around the contradictions produced by the conflict and the tension between the choice of political struggle and the option of armed resistance.

Was armed action a result of a choice made by the national movement, considering it as a political expression of the desire to achieve Morocco’s independence? Or was it an independent action that occurred spontaneously? Or was it a choice that emerged as a result of rebellion against the political approach of this movement, which relied on peaceful means to achieve that goal while condemning resorting to violence?

It is not primarily important to definitively answer these questions; what matters to us is an attempt to discern the characteristics of the interaction between political struggle and armed violence through the most important stages it went through during the 1950s.

In this regard, Professor Abdulkarim Ghallab states that “the idea of resistance was not excluded from the program of the Independence Party, but the party did not record or organize it openly in its work. It emphasized that it was a political party that operated through political methods, in order to be able to work without being hindered by irresponsible or overly enthusiastic actions that were not timely. The party emphasized to the activists that the struggle should remain within the realm of political work and complete mobilization, unless it directly affected Mohammed V. In that case, all cells should do what the struggle required of them.”

However, it is worth noting based on three elements: firstly, the party called for resistance indirectly; secondly, Allal Al Fassi called for continuing the struggle from Cairo (this was after the exile of the king); and thirdly, some members of the temporary executive committee of the party and some local leaders in Casablanca were involved in distributing the “first” weapons, some of which were transported to Oujda and some to Marrakech. This, in its simplicity, was the starting point.

From this, it can be concluded that “the resistance was not spontaneous, nor was it separate from the party’s organizations. Therefore, it was not a revolution against the party’s ideology and plan, although it entered the “tactics” that the party had to use, allowing some of its members to bear the responsibility without it being a decision issued in the name of the party.”

Professor Ghallab notes that the beginnings of armed resistance were linked to the massacre of Casablanca in 1947, although they were small and limited groups. It only gained momentum when the independence movement entered the stage of secrecy after the party was dissolved again in December 1952.

However, what Professor Ghallab overlooks is that many leaders of the Independence Party openly opposed the use of violence and resorting to armed struggle until the incident of the king’s exile, and some of them continued to adhere to their stance until the date of achieving independence.

We can include testimonies from a group of researchers confirming what Professor Abdelmajid Benjelloun

concludes when he states that the operations of the fedayeen and the Liberation Army later on were “the result of activities of groups of active elements who acted independently of political parties.” This is supported by testimonies of individuals who were active in the field at that time, speaking about the emergence of the first cell by the martyr Al-Zarqatouni in 1948. It is worth noting that the party had chosen him for the task of monitoring party organizations in Casablanca to prevent any penetration towards terrorism or armed action.

Mohammed Khalil Boukhreiss, one of the companions of the martyr Al-Zerqatouni, describes the new discourse that emerged from the conviction to resort to armed struggle, saying: “It was the discourse of the elite, who were raised in the Independence Party and were radical. They chose armed resistance as a means to struggle for freedom and independence.” Speaking about the circumstances of his meeting with the martyr Al-Zerqatouni, he says: “I met the martyr in circumstances that were conducive to inspiring the youth, as the readiness for martyrdom had matured after the diligent political work carried out by the party (the Independence Party) since 1944, through organization and spreading national awareness among the people, which integrated the political, youth, cultural, and community dimensions.”

The resistance fighters would maintain their relative independence from the political leadership, which had been cautious about armed action since the early days of the national struggle, leaning towards peaceful struggle through boycott committees and boycotting French goods, especially cigarettes, and other mobilization methods.

The divergence of the resistance from the political line of the national leadership would deepen further when the latter made the Algerian resistance an objective ally, especially as they shared the same characteristics and objectives in their war against French colonialism. Additionally, the Algerian experience had advanced in terms of military expertise due to the long journey it had gone through, unlike its counterpart in Morocco.

After the flame of martyrdom was ignited, the great ambition of the resistance leader, martyr Al-Zerqatouni, was to spread the revolution to the mountains and give the armed resistance a national dimension by coordinating between the pockets of resistance that had formed on the national territory. He was even a candidate to be the coordinator with the Algerian resistance. The theologian Al-Basri stated: “We began preparing to travel to the north because we received the message that the revolution was being prepared in Algeria (…). So, we prepared to travel to the north to contact the Algerians for coordination in order to develop the resistance from being clandestine to being open, and for him to be responsible for all coordination with Algeria. That was the plan we agreed upon. Unfortunately, he was arrested and then martyred” (Al-Zerqatouni was martyred on November 18, 1954). Indeed, as the martyr predicted, the flames of armed struggle spread throughout the regions: “In Morocco, the National Liberation Movement witnessed intense and effective activities due to urban armed resistance movements. The work of these movements expanded from cities to include the countryside, with uprisings in the Zemm River, Khouribga, the Little Atlas, Ksabi Tadla, and Khénifra. At this time, when the liberation struggle was escalating, the revolutionary leaders who had sought refuge in Tetouan were considering establishing the Army of Liberation, following the example of the Algerian revolution that had started in the mountains in November 1954 and the guerrilla warfare in India and China, in which many Moroccan soldiers participated.”

Drawing on the experience of Prince Abdelkrim Khattabi, who had the same ambition to establish a committee for the liberation of the Arab Maghreb, an ambition that remained unfulfilled due to disagreements among the Moroccan political leaders, it became difficult to coordinate between its components. The preoccupation of the resistance fighters, who were forced by increasing pressures in the region under French colonization, to migrate and seek refuge in the northern region under Spanish influence on the one hand, and the Algerian resistance fighters on the other hand, was to ensure their independence from the political activists at that time. This was particularly evident in the meetings that took place in Nador under the supervision of Egyptians, with the aim of coordinating efforts to

And it is worth noting that despite the fact that “the national movement in northern Morocco formed the background for the liberation struggle, a strong fortress for the resistance and its leaders, and later for the Liberation Army and its leadership,” and despite the fact that it also served as a main source for the supply of weapons and money, the leadership of the Liberation Army, which remained in the field, always maintained a distance between itself and various political leaderships, despite all the penetration and containment attempts by the latter. And despite the existence of a joint committee called the Resistance Committee, which insisted on maintaining its independence from political parties, it viewed itself as ready at any time to negotiate with the French colonialism, believing in the illusion that real independence could be achieved through negotiations.

The autumn of 1955 did not come until about ten thousand men had been organized and prepared, although the field forces were approximately five thousand. As for the rural sector in the army, it was the first sector to be formed from units that were organized later in the Middle Atlas Mountains and in the Souss Valley in Agadir, and Abdallah Sahnaji was in charge of the leadership in the western region of the Rif Mountains between Tétouan and Nador, extending south towards Ouazzane and the village of Bammehmed. Al-Abbasi, on the other hand, was the commander of the central Rif region north of Fes and Taza, including the fortresses around Bured and Tensift and Aknoul. In the north, most of the men belonged to the tribes of the central Rif Mountains, and they were famous for their fighting qualities that had been known about them since the revolution of Abdelkrim. In the Middle Atlas Mountains, the original center of the organization was established among the Marmusha tribes in the area south of Taza, which could be reached from Algeria through the sparsely populated area, and the barren southeastern plains of Morocco. Some units were also established in the south, relying on weapons and trained men coming through Ifni and the Spanish region.

The armed struggle expanded throughout the entire national territory, with the participation of Moroccan soldiers and officers who defected from the colonial forces to join the Moroccan Liberation Army. This pressured France to expedite the negotiation process, which concluded with the return of the king on November 16, 1955. However, the Liberation Army members were not convinced of the necessity to disarm, as they strongly opposed the negotiation process with France. This led to a series of operations against the colonial forces.

As direct negotiations with France began, following the formation of the first Moroccan coalition government that included various political parties, disagreements between the leadership of the Liberation Army and other political leaders emerged. These disagreements arose from the political leaders’ attempt to present themselves as guardians of the resistance and the Liberation Army, using it as leverage to rearrange power after France’s departure.

“In the early months of 1956, intermittent attacks targeted front guard posts and government offices in the countryside. The Liberation Army units in the Middle Atlas Mountains expanded their activities by launching new attacks near Khénifra and Khemisset. As the Liberation Army became more active, the threat it posed to the establishment of order in Morocco increased, and controlling it became more difficult. The plans to integrate the Liberation Army into the Royal Army were not implemented until the signing of the French-Moroccan agreement. Delegations of independence leaders went to the Rif region to communicate with the officials of the Liberation Army and learn about their conditions for ceasing the fighting. The initial exploratory talks, conducted by the leaders of the Independence Party, caused significant confusion and disappointment among the tribal gang members who expected to continue fighting for the liberation of all North Africa, without understanding the political complexities of the parties involved.”

On November 10, 1955, the Supreme Command issued a statement that said: “In the face of a wave of appeals from political bodies or misleading groups trying to deceive the Moroccan public opinion and the international public opinion that they have a significant role in the Moroccan resistance and the Liberation Army, the Resistance and the Liberation Army declare that none of these individuals have the right to speak on their behalf, especially since some of them have a history of disgraceful positions that bring shame upon them.”

As the prospect of victory seemed close and the opportunists resurfaced, adopting their previous stance of destructive actions and undermining the achievements made by the blood of the martyrs and the beloved Morocco, we do not accept this.

In the face of this blatant interference, the Resistance and the Liberation Army emphasize that these opportunists have no right to speak on their behalf. We take this opportunity to issue a strong warning to anyone who presumes to interfere in matters that do not concern them. Yes, there are those whom we consider indebted to their bravery and courage, those who follow their leadership, confident in their wisdom, and deserving of listening to their guidance and answering their call. That is His Majesty our King, the bearer of the torch of national struggle in its most critical stages.”

In response to His Majesty’s desire to maintain calm until France’s intentions in the negotiations become clear

and demonstrate their readiness and good intentions, the General Command of the Liberation Army, in agreement with the Resistance, decided to temporarily halt military operations while maintaining the positions of the Liberation Army until the Moroccan sovereignty is fully realized without any conditions or restrictions.”

However, the main trajectory that the resistance took, which gradually distanced itself from the political activity of the Independence Party and the Shura Party, was characterized by a radicalism in resorting to armed violence independently of these parties. It acquired, with the hardening of the political positions of these parties in condemning acts of violence, a secretive nature, even from the parties themselves. It took on the nature of a revolution for the new generation, which considered these political leaderships to be working at a slow pace and characterized by small bourgeois traits that made them incapable of mobilizing the people’s energies to confront the colonizers. Instead, they contented themselves with political condemnation and peaceful struggle, which resulted in accepting negotiations with the colonizers, despite the fact that they were the ones who pushed for the launch of these negotiations when they crystallized their main aspirations in their demands: the demand for the return of the king, whom they made a symbol of national sovereignty, and then the liberation of all the lands of the Arab Moroccan region based on its commitments within the Moroccan Arab Liberation Army.

Within this document, Mahdi Ben Barka reviews the three stages through which the national struggle has passed, which can be summarized as follows: The first stage was characterized by the negative impact of not positively appreciating the broad masses’ involvement, including peasants and workers, within the national movement. The second stage was marked by the integration of the inhabitants of the desert and rural areas into the resistance, providing a reservoir and a base for the formation of the liberation army, but with a lack of clarity in addressing the issue of violence as a political method, which manifested in the fusion of political and military means. The third stage was primarily characterized by the absence of a strategy that incorporates the intermediate goals within a future unity of the common destiny of the Maghreb countries. Instead, there was contentment with half-solutions (such as the Évian Accords), or even worse, a failure to utilize this opportunity to address the broad masses in order to clarify the situation for the wider militants, ensuring the “definition of the requirements of a radical liberation battle.” He concludes that “no one can deny the role he played in the sudden transformation of French politics, the intertwining of the Algerian and Moroccan liberation movements, and the resulting consequences. It is also not a coincidence that, at the same time, the militants began to grasp the deep meaning of the national struggle, even if they only started to understand the symbolism. At that time, the colonizers themselves understood the emotional significance of the return of the king from exile. Today, when we analyze these correspondences after the passage of time, we realize that colonial policy has reached the peak of intelligence, far beyond what we could have imagined.

Yes, the Machiavellian aspects of this policy began to emerge when colonization began to implement it on a wider scale across the African continent. However, since the end of 1956, bitterness and disappointment have started to appear in the hearts of many activists, especially resistance leaders and the liberation army, as it felt like an intuitive sense that the progress of the revolution had come to a halt.

Did we take into account this feeling of disappointment and draw positive conclusions from it, as we should have? Did we explain the significance of the “X Lebane” solution after the clear and evident policy of opposition emerged when Klawi announced his theatrical retreat and prescribed repentance?

No, nothing of that sort happened. Instead, we took on that agreement with all its implications and presented it as a token of the French colonial retreat. (..)

In reality, we did not comprehend the significance of the turning point reached by our movement, and we did not prepare for it in due time, for reasons that can be debated about their validity. However, the tangible result is that we justified to ourselves that this settlement was merely a temporary halt in our revolutionary journey.

Implicitly, this halt was supposed to be utilized as a period of rest for the national movement to regain strength, address the inflation it had suffered, and assimilate the new revolutionary sectors within its ranks. However, these attempts, although executed with good intentions, were not placed within a comprehensive strategy, leading to unintended consequences and the decay of the revolutionary movement’s apparatus.

The post-independence phase was an extension of the shadows of this tension, which intensified with the emergence of new challenges characterized by a struggle over power-sharing after the removal of the remaining colonizer, who still exerted influence through his pockets, whether political, military, or economic.

Regarding the aspect that concerns us, these extensions will cast their shadows on the political contradictions that surfaced within the Independence Party, just before the party split. They will directly impact the liberation army, making it subject to new political challenges that have made every effort to infiltrate it. Ashford describes the situation at the end of 1958, saying: “..As for the Moroccan liberation army, it seemed to be going through a difficult transitional period, although the tension was only evident between the two factions of the Independence Party. It was no longer a national issue, and it appeared that the guerilla forces in the Agadir region and the tribes in the Spanish-French zone to the south were pledging allegiance to the king and [Allal] Al Fassi. Some units that remained loyal to the Fqih Al Basri and the active group within the Independence Party.

In this context, the containment stages will begin for various formations of the Liberation Army. While the south was experiencing the contradictions within the Independence Party during the general choices for the future of the country, Mehdi Ben Barka will announce, on the occasion of his split from the Independence Party, the establishment of a new party called the National Union of Popular Forces. He will state, “We must achieve unity among the three major forces in Morocco: the unions, the farmers, and the resistance. The resistance will be the bridge towards the neglected rural world by previous governments.”

At that time, the regular army was under the command of General Oufkir and carried out cleansing campaigns targeting the elimination of resistance in the Rif region, the north in general, and the Atlas Mountains, uprooting the last strongholds of armed struggle in these areas. These actions continued alongside the restructuring of the regular army. This restructuring provided another opportunity to deepen the gap between the new opposition and the regime, as it aimed to strengthen the central authority of the king and involved issues related to defense policy, army organization plans, defining its goals, and directives. This led to an increase in criticism of the army, even among moderates like Belafrej, who once stated that his government was not allowed to change the existing relationship between the government and the army. Additionally, the National Union of Moroccan Students conference at that time launched an attack on what they called a “showcase army” and opposed the costs associated with this institution, not to mention the continued presence of foreign officers among its ranks, which was considered the most extreme view regarding the army. These views were held by the most progressive elements within the Independence Party. The most significant shift in the balance of power was the new party’s stance on the establishment of the “Constitutional Council” (Dahir of November 3, 1960), where Al-Mahdi announced an absolute rejection of participating in this council, which he considered to be a creation of a theocratic and feudal system seeking to revive the old social structures of Moroccan society and preserve the old privileges.

When the government of Abdullah Ibrahim takes steps to expel French officials within the police and the army and opens a discussion about the responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior and National Security, a divorce will occur between the palace and the opposition. The direct confrontation will arise between a monarchical regime that bases its legitimacy on the material power of the army and the political and administrative power of the Ministry of Interior, and a new party that will prove its new strength by winning 23% of the municipal and rural elections in May 1960.

The 1960s will witness a significant turning point in Morocco’s history, deserving its own analytical review. Here, we will briefly outline some key milestones to understand the general political situation in the country during this period.

With the fall of Abdullah Ibrahim’s government and the ascension of Crown Prince Hassan II, on behalf of his father, the new government will announce a complete separation between royal rule and the opposition. This time, the new party will be the National Union of Popular Forces, which split from the Independence Party. The tipping point will be the arrest of the theologian El Bassiri and Abdelrahmane El Youssoufi, the director and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Al-Tahrir, respectively. The newspaper declared that the government should be accountable to the people, not the king. This separation will continue until the government of Al-Natwab, headed by Youssoufi in 1997.

The first three years of the 1960s witnessed a direct and violent conflict between the royal authority, which succeeded in building a regular army under its absolute control since the independence, and the police force headed by General Oufkir, who became one of the prominent figures shaping Morocco’s history in the following decades. During this period, a war was waged against various public administrations with the aim of removing all the individuals who were integrated into them by the Independence Party, including leaders, workers, and department heads, and replacing them with technocratic figures close to the palace. This phase also saw a series of political maneuvers and arrests among the resistance members who had joined the new party.

Abdelhadi Boutaleb and Ahmed Yousfi, the director and editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Al-Tahrir,” were arrested on charges of attacking the king, inciting crimes against state security, engaging in acts that undermine public security, and endangering the safety of the state. This was followed by the arrest of a group of veterans of the liberation army, including Abdullah Sahnounji, Mohamed Ben Said, Boushaib Dukkali, and Mohamed Zahabi, on February 13, 1960, on charges of attempting to assassinate the Crown Prince. It was also decided to dissolve the Sahara Army. “Dangerous steps were taken in supporting the policy of repression in Morocco on July 12, 1960, when the General Directorate of National Security was entrusted to Colonel Oufkir, marking the beginning of a dark era in the summer of 1960.”

Events accelerated with the holding of municipal elections in May 1960 (which had been continuously delayed since 1957 due to the Independence Party’s control over the administration’s mechanisms, although it was one of the main tasks of Prime Minister Abdallah Ibrahim to prepare for these elections). The opposition condemned these elections due to the violations and pressures that characterized them, considering them an opportunity for the royal authority to create a “third force” composed of local dignitaries, rural and administrative elites, which would remain distant from political conflicts and maintain religious and traditional authority. This third force would act as an intermediary and political support for the royal regime in exchange for economic privileges, positioning itself as a class of compradors.

The second congress of the National Union Party, held between May 25 and 27, 1962, provided an opportunity to define its political positions regarding the overall situation of the country. The congress emphasized the results of the six years of independence, which were characterized by “the experience of absolute rule practiced directly by the monarchy.” The report listed these results, including the emergence of absolute individual rule, the establishment of a corrupt administrative apparatus characterized by irresponsibility, privileges, favoritism, and the moral and physical liquidation of all national resistance organizations. It also highlighted the vengeful and vindictive policies adopted against the fighters who had long fought against colonialism.

A few months after this conference, the opposition was surprised by the king’s decision to present the first official constitution of the country for a yes or no referendum. The National Union of Popular Forces decided to boycott the referendum even before reviewing its content, protesting against it being prepared in secrecy. However, this party remained adamant in its demand for the election of a constitutional council to accomplish this task. On the other hand, the Independence Party decided, after hesitation, to vote in favor of the constitution.

The results of the referendum, which took place on the seventh of December, confirmed the overwhelming support for the new constitution and demonstrated the setback of the opposition, particularly the National Union party, which called for its boycott.

As a result, events escalated rapidly, as the period preceding the legislative elections on May 17th, 1963 became an occasion for intensified conflict between the opposition and the broad front of the Fédération de la Koutla. It also provided an opportunity for the dissemination of ideas for radical change within the ranks of the National Union party, even reinforcing the positions of the Independence Party itself, which emerged defeated from its experience of participating in the government. The opposition revolted against the election fraud that marred these elections, leading to arrests of members of the Independence Party. The government filed lawsuits against newspapers such as Al-Alam, Al-Oumma Al-Ifrqiya, and Al-Tahrir.

This tension, which witnessed a dangerous escalation on the eve of the local elections held on July 28th, and on July 16th, 1963, the National Council of the National Union of Popular Forces held a meeting and decided to boycott the local elections scheduled to take place at the end of the month. This was in protest against the blatant interventions of the administration in the preceding stages of the voting day, with the aim of favoring the Fédération de la Koutla, the administrative party founded by Minister of the Interior Akdiro. Prior to the end of the meeting, security forces occupied the party headquarters, arrested all those present, and transferred them to the Security Commissioner in Casablanca.

Alongside those who were arrested at the Union headquarters in Casablanca, the national campaign expanded to generate regional and local campaigns. Police stations were filled with activists and sympathizers or non-sympathizers of the Popular Forces: thousands of people were tortured because Ben Aqir intended to deceive public opinion by suggesting that a coup to change the regime was imminent and that thanks to the security forces, the plot had been foiled.

These arrests were followed by a trial in which 106 individuals were charged with compromising the internal security of the state. Abdul Rahim Bouabid commented on this, stating that the methods used by the police and the public prosecutor’s office were no different from the methods we were victims of in 1952 during the colonial period. The trial began at the end of the year and continued until March 14th when verdicts were issued. These verdicts included eleven death sentences, eight of which were in absentia against Mahdi Ben Barka and Sheikh Al-Arabi, and three life sentences against Al-Basri, Momen Al-Diyouri, and Omar Ben Gloun.

During this period, armed operations were carried out by Sheikh Al-Arabi’s group, which ended with his death on August 7th of the same year. Al-Halawi says about Sheikh Al-Arabi: “Sheikh Al-Arabi, from his position in the Liberation Army, followed all these sectarian maneuvers against anything national, preparing for the loss of national land and enabling colonization to regain control of the country’s resources, both directly and indirectly. From here, his involvement continued as part of a work that would later be known as the case of Ben Hamu Al-Fakri, who was executed in 1959, and Sheikh Al-Arabi was also sentenced to death in absentia. This movement continued afterward from his position as one of the most important popular leaders who fully shouldered the responsibility in embodying what the party and its leadership crystallized after the coup against the national government in May 1960 through intensified struggle programs embodied in the slogan ‘radical change.’ There was no party official who did not give a lecture, presentation, or address gatherings about it or write a publication across the national territory… Everyone remembers – except for those whose interest lies in forgetting – the strikes that took place in 1961 and during the battle of the ‘Granted Constitution, the stench of garbage,’ as the party’s slogan was at that time (1962), as well as the discussions during the party’s second conference in the same year, the ‘Revolutionary Choice’ document, and the three mistakes made by the martyr Mahdi in the same year, the battle of the elections, and the intensity of the confrontation in them, as well as the famous trials.

All of these events are interconnected and have given rise to various positions and initiatives, including Sheikh Al-Arabi’s experience, which was an extension in time and embodiment of the party’s proposal at that stage, the stage of ‘radical change’ as a reaction to the coup in May 1960 against Abdullah Ibrahim’s national project.”

From the events of March 1965 and the trials of Marrakesh in 1970, the distinctive feature of the 1960s era will remain the complete and absolute denial of any right to opposition and the continuation of a series of horror and repression. This is in addition to numerous maneuvers to create administrative parties based on buying consciences and harnessing administrative apparatuses.

Since that date, there have been successive maneuvers, provocations, arrests, and prosecutions against anyone suspected of opposing the regime. This policy has become the prevailing face of the Oufkir era after he assumed the position of Minister of the Interior in August 1964 while retaining the presidency of the General Directorate of National Security. “Oufkir simply wanted to eliminate the party that made citizens rebel against the establishment,” as he put it. And rebellion, in their view, is for Moroccans not to bow their heads to the rulers (1963, p. 14).

And passing through the March 1965 uprising, which was met with a fierce repression campaign under the supervision of Oufkir himself, and the assassination of Mahdi Ben Barka in October of the same year (where he was sentenced to life imprisonment by the French court of “Lesigny”). And the trials of Marrakesh in 1970, the repressive nature remained the only response to opposition through maneuvering and fabricating conflicts to strike all forms of opposition even before its resurgence, until the events of March 1973 occurred.

The theoretical backgrounds of the 1973 movement.

Political literature is rich in various analyses of the concepts of violence and counter-violence, ever since the French Revolution imposed the treatment of the concept of violence within the general concept of its legitimacy as the only choice to achieve a radical break with the past, considering that change cannot come spontaneously but requires the force of change, which necessitates resorting to violence to impose new ideas. Additionally, since modern states have their own logic in justifying the use of violence to maintain security and stability whenever they perceive a threat to their existence and legitimacy.

However, the contents of these concepts take on serious human dimensions when an oppressive state resorts to systematic and escalating violence in the face of a deprived society that is deprived of all means and channels through which it can express its protest and assert its demands and rights, which it sees as having greater legitimacy than those of the state, considering that the state exists to serve the people. This is especially true when these rights and demands are trampled upon by the state itself. In such a situation, some citizens may be convinced of the necessity to resort to counter-violence as the only means to assert their legitimate rights or express their anger at the situation generated by the prevailing system.

The general ideas and theoretical touches on the concept of revolutionary violence among most adherents of this approach, associated with the events of March 1973, caution us to examine their program and project. They drew inspiration from the experiences of revolutionary violence witnessed by some Latin American and Indian peoples, even though in their general features and the approach they adopted, they are closer to the Cuban experience, which does not believe in coups or mass action as much as it seeks to create “closed and shaped revolutionary foci” composed of a group of professional revolutionaries capable of igniting the spark of war without waiting for the consciousness of the masses. This is what is known as the “foco theory,” whose main characteristic is that instead of discussing the objective or subjective conditions of armed struggle, it involves engaging in armed struggle in the hope that it will create the spark that will ignite the revolution.

Through the excerpts in which the Basra jurist spoke (he will leave Morocco in August 1966 and return after thirty years of exile and opposition abroad) about the events of March 3, this inclination will be evident when he says: “The people who entered Morocco entered on the basis of building revolutionary sites within the country. They did not enter with the intention of blowing up the situation at that time or achieving a revolution within the country in haste. Also, based on their conviction that Algeria cannot create a revolution. Especially since it was afraid of a revolution in Morocco, and Algeria oppressed us as fighters and did not provide us with any clear settlement. It is better for us to enter our country, build sites, give our people confidence, create a connection with them, qualify and strengthen our relationships with them until they become ready and capable of sacrifice and rally around the “revolutionary centers” during that period.”

If the issues are bigger than can be reduced to this direction alone, this dream was shared by a group of militants of the National Union within Morocco, who, despite operating within a legitimate political framework, believed in the necessity of revolutionary violence as a response to the regime’s positions. Among them was Mohammed Al-Qasimi, who was the leader of the Popular Forces Party in Khénifra and its surroundings during the 1970s. He was subjected to brutal torture in secret police stations, lost his eyesight, had his genitals mutilated, and one of his testicles was removed. He says: “We were weaving revolutionary cells. We created eight cells in Khénifra alone. We started with five members and when we reached eight, we moved to a second cell. We created these cells using all the letters present in the city… When the arrests and interrogations took place regarding these cells, we said they were ‘party cells.’ The preparations began in 1969 when Oumada used to travel between Morocco and Algeria, trying to convince a group of citizens in Khénifra, Al-Hajeb, and Merirt to join the revolution project.”

Through the excerpts in which the Basra jurist spoke (he will leave Morocco in August 1966 and return after thirty years of exile and opposition abroad) about the events of March 3, this inclination will be evident when he says: “The people who entered Morocco entered on the basis of building revolutionary sites within the country. They did not enter with the intention of blowing up the situation at that time or achieving a revolution within the country in haste. Also, based on their conviction that Algeria cannot create a revolution. Especially since it was afraid of a revolution in Morocco, and Algeria oppressed us as fighters and did not provide us with any clear settlement. It is better for us to enter our country, build sites, give our people confidence, create a connection with them, qualify and strengthen our relationships with them until they become ready and capable of sacrifice and rally around the “revolutionary centers” during that period.”

If the issues are bigger than can be reduced to this direction alone, this dream was shared by a group of militants of the National Union within Morocco, who, despite operating within a legitimate political framework, believed in the necessity of revolutionary violence as a response to the regime’s positions. Among them was Mohammed Al-Qasimi, who was the leader of the Popular Forces Party in Khénifra and its surroundings during the 1970s. He was subjected to brutal torture in secret police stations, lost his eyesight, had his genitals mutilated, and one of his testicles was removed. He says: “We were weaving revolutionary cells. We created eight cells in Khénifra alone. We started with five members and when we reached eight, we moved to a second cell. We created these cells using all the letters present in the city… When the arrests and interrogations took place regarding these cells, we said they were ‘party cells.’ The preparations began in 1969 when Oumada used to travel between Morocco and Algeria, trying to convince a group of citizens in Khénifra, Al-Hajeb, and Merirt to join the revolution project.”

Mohammed Amzian, one of those acquitted by the military court and kidnapped to be retried after three years of captivity, tells his story: “In 1969, a small commando entered from abroad and brought weapons with the help of Moroccans, including Moha or Al-Hajj. Among them were Al-Louzi, Abdullah Al-Namari, and Mohammed Al-Khalifa, who stayed at our house. (At that time, we lived in Jabouj in the forest, 50 kilometers away from the city of Khénifra, and the means of transportation were mules.) They stayed for two years, sleeping during the day and going out at night to train people on handling weapons. Oumada was one of the first to attempt to establish initial connections since 1968. Hussein Ikhich and Ait Zaid Al-Hussein were the link between the internal and external members. The latter also served as a link with Casablanca, from where he frequently traveled abroad to coordinate with the center located outside Morocco. He was the first to attract the attention of the authorities, who began monitoring his movements until they arrested him. Ait Zaid Al-Hussein came later to inform us of Al-Nasiri’s arrest (around June 1972) and asked us to alert others. With his ability to mislead the police, he brought them to a house he did not know and claimed it was the house he used to go to, giving his friends time to organize their affairs. After a while, he collapsed and led the police to Ali Amzian’s house, but I managed to escape and seek refuge in the

Things continued like this until a commando team of 17 people entered. Some of them went to Amalou, and some stayed in Koulmima. Six of them came to Khénifra, where a group consisting of Ahmed Bouyagoub, Mohammed Bouyagoub, Mouha Ou El Haj, Mouha Ou Ali, and Oumda went to bring them. When the commando team arrived in Khénifra, they spent their first night at Mouha Ou El Haj’s house. After that, they joined Oumda’s house in Amalou and stayed there for five days. Then everyone went to Arssali’s house, where they stayed for two months. It should be noted that the role of the commando team was focused on training in the use of weapons and guerrilla warfare techniques, while the role of some citizens was to encourage people to organize themselves into revolutionary cells, forming the broader base of the uprising when it started. Therefore, preparations were carried out on two levels: mobilizing citizens within secret cells operating under the cover of party activities and training in weapon use.

In his attempt to explain the failure of this experiment, Al-Qassimi says in his testimony: “If it weren’t for the haste of some individuals, and if the process of weaving and forming the cells had continued for an additional year, the results would have been positive. Another result of the haste is that the city of El-Hajeb and its coordinator Mahrouch, who was responsible for communication to receive instructions, remained disconnected from the events and, essentially, from the national instruction center located in Amalou where Bnouna was, and when Bnouna left on March 2nd, everything failed.”

Regarding the events that took place in Khénifra, Al-Qassimi recounts: “In Khénifra, two bombs were detonated, one in Bouziad, placed by El-Hajj Arssali, and the second in Mkouch, placed by El-Masoudi Lhassan. The third bomb did not explode and was placed in the small police station. A fourth bomb was supposed to be placed in the gas station owned by Assou Badi, but Mouha Ou El Hajj refused. In Moulai Bouazza, the revolutionaries agreed with Shawsh, whose name was mentioned, to open the store for them to seize the weapons inside. However, one of the revolutionaries panicked when he saw an armed guard and fired his Kalashnikov at him, causing confusion, and all the armed individuals withdrew to the mountains.”

Khénifra:

Khénifra is a small city located on the right bank of the Umm Er-Rbia River at an elevation of 830 meters. It was originally a settlement for the Ait Bouhaddou tribe from the Zayan group, and its construction began around 1877 with the troops sent by Sultan Moulay Al-Hassan to assist the famous leader Mouha Ou Hammou Zayani in pacifying the rebellious inhabitants of Ait Sekhman and Ichran. (Khénifra town, source 7.8)

Khénifra is situated at the foot of four mountains that surround it in a square shape. To the east is the

extension of the Aqallal mountain, to the west is the Abu Musa mountain, to the north is the Abu Hayati mountain, and to the south is the Al-Hayd Ou Bouzal mountain, as pronounced locally.

City of Khénifra is located on the banks of the Oum Er-Rbia River. Khénifra serves as the middle ground between the mountainous lands of the Zayanes and the Azghari lands, acting as their summer and winter resorts, respectively. The surrounding areas of Khénifra are known for their cedar forests, which held great value during the early construction of the city.

The fertile land of Khénifra was abundant with moist wheat, barley, and corn. It yielded crops twice a year and provided excellent grazing grounds for livestock, contributing to the prosperity of the inhabitants. Their sheep were considered among the best in Morocco.

It’s worth noting that the Azghar lands were larger than the mountainous lands, and when the French entered Khénifra, they attempted to exert pressure by controlling these lands and depriving the Zayane tribes of them, aiming to force their surrender. This weakened the tribes.

Appendices of the book:

1. Official reports regarding the events of March 1973
2. List of individuals sentenced to death in connection with the events

First Report

March 7, 1973

“A few days ago, a group of saboteurs, estimated to be three individuals according to initial investigation reports, managed to infiltrate from the direction of Meknes to the center of Moulai Bouazza, which was guarded by two storekeepers.

One of them opened the main door to identify those around the center, and his fate was death by gunfire, while his companion managed to inform the authorities.

At the same time, an armed group consisting of three individuals was reported in the Colmimah area.

Thanks to the vigilance of citizens and the swift and effective intervention of the Royal Armed Forces, Auxiliary Forces, and Royal Gendarmerie, the criminals were eliminated, and they will receive the severest punishment.

Based on initial investigation reports, it appears to be a premeditated plan with support from Libya, aimed at presenting a false image of Morocco as a country engulfed in chaos.

The Moroccan people will know how to put an end to all of this by relying on their vitality.

The Moroccan people are proud of their dignity and will not allow a group of traitors, driven from abroad, to tarnish the reputation of their history.”

Second Report

March 11, 1973

After the operation carried out by the Royal Armed Forces, Auxiliary Forces, and Gendarmerie, the rebels who were arrested and interrogated revealed that the group that crossed the borders from abroad was under the leadership of a person named Bouna Mohamed, also known as Mahmoud. The latter was killed in the clash that ended the attempts of this group.

According to these detainees, there are always other elements who will join them from the same destination. We currently know their routes and the list of their partners as well as their objectives.

The detainees further clarified that the armed group and the trained elements, supported by Libya, were tasked with creating a state of psychological tension and panic in several areas of Morocco by attacking isolated centers, causing chaos and a lack of security. The confessions of the detainees revealed that the organization sought refuge abroad, had leaders inside the country, and they disclosed their names. Thus, since Friday, security forces have arrested a number of them, including Omar Benjelloun, and the search is still ongoing.

Third Report

“During the combing operation carried out in the affected areas, a group of saboteurs was eliminated, while others were injured by the intervention groups working with the assistance of the local population.

Among the deceased were identified: Bouna Mohamed, known as Mahmoud; Suleiman, nicknamed Salim; and Ait Zaid Al-Arabi.

All those who were arrested are currently under investigation. Among them are: Abdullah Mohammed Ben Merzouk, known as Zaid Al-Hussein; Amehawsh Mouha Olhaj Ouba; Bassou Baadi; Otahdout; Al-Ikhwan Al-Hajj Ben Aba Ben Hamad; Rizkoun Mohammed, known as Sidi; Hadouthi Ahmed Ben Abdessalam; Mazouz Abdullah; Sohail Idris; and Rashidi Mohammed.

Meanwhile, there are other criminals who are currently on the run, and an intensive search is underway for them. Among them are: Merabetine Ibrahim, also known as Ibrahim Taznit; Al-Faqih, also known as Abdullah Al-Namari; Al-Qadri Abdurrahman; Oumada Mohammed, known as Al-Khattabi.”

Fourth Report

During these operations, weapons were seized, including machine guns, Molotov cocktails, talkie-walkies, explosives, and foreign military clothing.

It is worth mentioning that these criminals had partners inside the kingdom who were also arrested. They possessed financial resources that did not correspond to their personal financial situations. They confessed to obtaining weapons, materials, and funds from Libya.

These initial results were the outcome of the spontaneous mobilization of civilian groups in the affected areas and their cooperation with the security authorities.

The investigation is still ongoing, and the public will be informed of further developments in due course.”

Fifth Report

“Some newspapers have reported several arrests carried out by the Judicial Police.

The Ministry of Interior is able to confirm that these individuals were arrested following the initial investigation opened in response to the events that occurred in Morocco during the past few weeks. The arrests were made based on statements given by the detainees caught in the act, who provided detailed confessions. The search is still ongoing.”

Fifth Report

Under the headline “Complete Calm Prevails in Moulay Bouazza and Koulmimma,” the newspaper Lomatane will publish the latest report in this series, stating: “With the aim of informing our citizens about the results of ongoing search operations to put an end to the criminal activities of some destructive elements that recently attempted to sow chaos and threaten the security of citizens, the Ministry of Interior announces:

“The complete calm now prevails in the areas of Moulay Bouazza and Koulmimma, and the armed groups that attempted to establish a presence there have been dismantled.

The interrogation of the detainees has led to the discovery of a dangerous destructive organization that managed to spread across several Moroccan cities.

Ongoing investigations have resulted in the arrest of several criminals, including lawyers. The testimony of these individuals, especially a person named Laqadi, led to the arrest of Omar Dahkoun, who is considered responsible for the cells in Rabat and Casablanca. He had previously been sentenced in absentia to twenty years in prison during a trial in Marrakech.

Dahkoun confessed to all his accomplices, who are either in custody or being sought as fugitives.

On the other hand, he revealed the locations where weapons, equipment, and explosives were concealed.

As a result, the authorities responsible for the investigation seized machine guns, a significant amount of ammunition, explosives, and firearms in Casablanca, Rabat, and Oujda.

Thanks to these arrests, a spotlight has been shed on a group of criminal acts, and the perpetrators, including a lawyer named Boutarqa Mubarak, have been identified. All the arrested lawyers belong to the National Union of Popular Forces, known as the ‘Rabat Wing.’

At the current stage of the investigation, it is not possible to provide all the details without risking hindering the ongoing purification process.”

List of Individuals Sentenced to Death in the Kenitra Trial:

[Unfortunately, the provided text does not include the list of individu

als sentenced to death in the Kenitra trial.